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MAX L. STACKHOUSE. CREEDS, SOCIETY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A STUDY IN THREE 
CULTURES 
Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984. xii+ 315 PP· $19.95 
The purpose of this substantial study is twofold. First, it is a 
comparison of the concept and practice of human rights in three diverse 
societies: American, East German, and Indian. Second, it is an argument 
for the fundamental place of religion (or its subspecies, ideology) in 
determining the theory and conditioning the practice of what it means to 
be human in society, and for the particular conciliar-Puritan-ecumenical 
Christian religion, chastened by liberal insights, as a soil in which 
human rights can adequately grow. It is therefore not in the first place 
about human rights at all, but about the social and spiritual dimensions 
of these societies in their interpersonal, associational and collective 
relations as they express an understanding of the meaning and direction 
of human life. Rights--and duties, r e sponsibilities and mutual 
commitments -- emerge from this context. 
The three societies are each examined in two ways: first in cross-
section on a grid one axis of which moves from the material to the 
ideational, the other from the interpersonal to the collective -- then 
historically, showing the developments that made them what they are. 
Nevertheless they are not symmetrical, either in substance or in the way 
they are handled. The treatment of what the author calls the "western 
revolutionary tradition" clearly sets the theme. Roo ted in Biblical 
insights and continuing the cause of the Catholic conciliar movement, the 
Calvinist Reformed tradition -- especially its free-church side -- built 
into society the right of free participation by voluntary groups to 
worship God and follow God's calling in the world. The central concept 
of social organization became covenant, a form of social commitment and 
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responsibility at once discerned, and affirmed, voluntary and objectively 
real, individual and social. Rights are based on the transcendence of 
God, in the freedom which God gives in the covenant relationship, and in 
the covenant life of the church which informs, without identifying with, 
human contracts, agreements, constitutions and forms of order. Because 
of the transcendence of God, government must be relative and pluralistic. 
"The godly state is a secular state". 
T h i s  t h e m e  the author finds to be in counterpoint to the 
individualist assumptions of liberalism fathered by John Locke, with its 
self-evident freedoms based on reason and experience. They form a 
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synthesis and they need each other to save liberalism from a shallow 
utilitarianism and to save faith from an arbitrary understanding of the 
word of God for the world. This synthesis works as a ferment in western 
society toward more inclusive human rights and toward the expansion of 
responsible group life, but it is threatened by the impersonal and 
isolating forces of technology and economic power. Modern technological 
society is "eating up its ideological capital." 
The Marx-Leninist society of East Germany forms a contrast to this, 
but not a complete one. Here the author moves from participant to 
perceptive observer, and from a society that has organically grown to one 
whose ideological system has been imposed by con quest and is inwardly 
resisted by the traditional culture of the people. The ideology, which 
he sees as increasingly a religion-substitute, is clearly dominant, and 
its policies are well described as they interact with traditional German 
institutions in education, culture, law, family, medicine and technology. 
The picture is informative, the more so as it is filled out with personal 
experience. The interplay between ideology and tradition in education 
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and culture is especially well portrayed. The impact of Leninist law on 
the family is also illuminating. The chapter closes with a picture of 
the somewhat confused relations between the two religious forces at work: 
the Marx-Leninist Party and the predominant Lutheran Evangelical Church. 
There are, however, problems with the picture Stackhouse presents 
here. This writer would suggest two. They are both rooted in his effort 
to draw a predominantly German line of intellectual history from Lut her 
and Machiavelli through Rousseau to Hegel, Marx, and the present 
Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic. The thread of 
this history is the separation of the private from the public and the 
search in the public sphere for an absolute order which carries its 
justification in itself and dismantles the judgment of the transcendent. 
One can make such a case, but it also distorts current reality in at 
least two ways. 
First, o n e  can make a case for a connection between Luther's 
suspicion of worldly order and reason as corrupt like all that is human, 
and the Marxist suspicion of moral absolutes, including rights language, 
as the ideology of possessing classes. One can move from Machiavelli's 
political c yn i cism o r  from Rousseau's romanticism to the Marxist 
bureaucracy of the G.D.R. Hegel's dependence on a Lutheran ethos and his 
philosophical ancestry to Marx are clear. But dependence on this line 
leaves out some fundamental influences which have made East German 
society what it is today. Luther not only opened the way for a strong 
bureau cratic state. H e  w a s  responsible for an ethos of official 
integrity and the rule of incorruptible law within that sta te, o f  
personal honesty and vocational dedication throughout the society which 
has held Germany together despite all that has happened to it. The fever 
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of Nazism shook it to its foundations but did not destroy it. Resistance 
to Hitler was rooted in it. The confrontation of  this ethos with Marx-
Leninism: concern fot truth vs. ideological thought; responsible 
vocation vs. the demands o f  total planning; family integrity vs. 
political solidarity; impartial justice vs. "socialist legality"; here 
is where the real drama o f  the East German struggle is to be found. 
Second, there is no doubt that Karl Marx was a German; Leninism in 
its present East German f o rm however i s  hardly a native German 
phenomenon. There has been and is a German Marxism. It runs from 
Lasalle through the Social Democratic Party under Kautsky (Lenin' s 
"renegade"), Ebert, Ernst Reuter and Willi Brandt. It is embodied in 
creative minds like Habermas and Bloch. But the Socialist Unity Party 
does not express this. To understand its history one must go by way o f  
Lenin and the Russian revolution, the ideology and policies o f  Stalin and 
their later modification in Soviet society. This tradition is expressed 
in the German language again, and has developed certain German quirks -­
among them a penchant for ideological and bureaucratic rigidity -- but 
there is little in it that is originally German. Nevertheless, o f  
course, the social situation o f  Germany, divided between two worlds, the 
persistence o f  the Prussian ethos, and the active witness o f  the 
Evangelical Church do make the German encounter with Marx-Leninist 
ideology and power dif ferent from that in ethnically and culturally more 
self-contained societies. Some o f  these dif ferences Stackhouse helpfully 
observes and records as he describes a country in structural and 
conceptual uncertainty. 
Stackhouse's third society is India. His description o f  it is the 
most eloquent in the book. Here is no western rebellion, but a genuinely 
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different traditional society rooted in caste and family, a much more 
complex and flexible system than we usually understand, and exuding a 
sense of cosmic order that dwarfs history and change. India is in the 
midst of modernization and development of course, but the author presents 
the picture of a deep and tough texture of values and social organization 
that turns even Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru into episodes, and turns 
economic development and secular democracy into a secondary phenomenon 
more of interest to the minorities of Christians and Marxists than to the 
masses. In the Hindu renaissance this society has moved to absorb these 
changes, but rights remain related to place and status in society, not to 
person as such. 
This picture contrasts with that which we so often hear from Indians 
themselves - intellectual Christians or Marxists as most of them are. 
They might recognize it, but the difference would be one of emphasis, or 
perhaps o f  faith .  T h i s  rai ses a deeper question to the whole of 
Stackhouse's study. Christian conviction plays a strong role in it. 
His conclusion is that freedom "finally has no metaphysical foundation 
either in Marxism-Leninism or in Hinduism" because there is in them no 
transcendent G o d  to judge and to redeem. Rights are born in the 
continual relativization of human righteousness and power and the 
continual reform of human institutions which occurs in freedom under that 
transcendence. But in the sections on East Germany and India the actual 
efforts of the churches to bear this witness are too little described. 
In the East German paradigm, graphically drawn on P• 265, the churches 
are shown as an influential outside force, the one alternative center of 
meaning and action to that of the Socialist Unity Party. But there is a 
large body of Christian social thought which these churches have produced 
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as they were challenged by one confrontation after another, which is only 
referred to. On the Indian paradigm on the next page, Christianity does 
not appear at all, and little reference is made in the text to Christian 
thought or action. This is sociologically understandable, but from the 
point of view of the argument of this book, a rich resource has been 
neglected. 
Perhaps, however, this omission is understandable in the light of 
the purpose of the study. This is not a systematic, but an historical, 
sociological work. It compares three different societies with differ�nt 
understandings of what is rightly human, and evaluates them critically in 
the light of a clearly stated theological conviction. A study of the 
"public theology" and the actual self-reformation and witness of the 
churches in these societies, is work for another volume. 
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